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"Necessity Hath No Law"*:
Executive Power and the Posse Comitatus Act
CANDIDUS DOUGHERTYT
"When a government wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom, and reduce
them to slavery, it generally makes use of a standing army."'
Luther Martin
INTRODUCTION
Dating back to Roman times, civilian distrust of a standing army
has been a constant theme.2 Nations have raised armies to protect
their national defense interests but have sharply segregated military
and civilian affairs in order to protect civilian life from military oppres-
sion. During peacetimes, this segregation has left the military-a
highly-trained and effective resource-idle and seemingly available to
aid in quelling domestic crises.
Yet, when civilian authorities have utilized the armed forces in
domestic law enforcement roles, time and again the eventual result has
been disaster. For the Romans, it was the fall of their empire. For the
American Colonists, it was the Boston Massacre. For the Reconstruc-
tion Era South, it was the federal troop occupation.
The issue of military involvement in civilian affairs entered the
national spotlight once again in September 2005, when the Depart-
* The quoted text was originally articulated by Oliver Cromwell. Max Radin,
Martial Law & the State of Siege, 30 CAL. L. REV. 634, 641 (1942).
f Adjunct Professor, Rutgers School of Law - Camden. I would like to thank the
staff of the Campbell Law Review for their diligence and excellent work.
1. Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward A Right To Civil Law
Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 383, 391 (2003) (quoting Luther Martin of
Maryland to the Maryland legislature).
2. In Roman times, the professional army was broken into smaller groups, or
legions, in order to distribute its power. John F. Romano, State Militias and the United
States: Changed Responsibilities for a New Era, 56 A.F. L. REV. 233, 238 (2005).
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ment of Defense (DOD) posited that it would have been illegal for the
government to send military troops into New Orleans to evacuate
those stranded by Hurricane Katrina and the flood that followed.3
Specifically, the DOD pointed to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878
(PCA),4 a law that purportedly criminalized the use of the military in
domestic law enforcement.
After watching live news coverage of thousands of people being
herded to the New Orleans Convention Center and the Superdome to
be left without food, water, medicine, or sanitation, the nation
responded furiously. 5 Clearly, it seemed, the United States ought to
have been able to employ the military in rescuing its own people from
a natural disaster occurring within America's borders; any law that
prohibits such humanitarian efforts must be repealed.
As the saying goes, hindsight is always twenty/twenty. After much
legal scrutiny, it appears that the government's trepidation due to the
PCA was misguided.6 In all likelihood, deploying troops to New Orle-
ans for a rescue operation would have been lawful under the PCA, but
this conclusion did not end the debate over the propriety of the PCA.7
After the Katrina Disaster, some commentators asserted that the
PCA must be entirely redrafted or just plain repealed; the Executive
should not be prohibited from using the military to enforce the law
following a natural disaster.8 The federal government responded to
3. Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Military May Propose an Active-Duty Force for
Relief Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/10/11/politics/ llmilitary.html. Interestingly, the first explanation regarding
the delay came from former FEMA Director Michael Brown, who claimed there had
been a breakdown in communication: the federal government did not know that
people were stranded at both the Convention Center and the Superdome. The Big
Disconnect on New Orleans, CNN, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/
02/katrina.response/. This excuse was not very compelling considering CNN had
been running 24-hour live news coverage reporting the locations of the stranded
individuals.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Bush to Send More Troops to Louisiana, Fox NEws, Sept. 3, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168398,00.html; Relief Workers Confront
"Urban Warfare," CNN, Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/09/01/
katrina.impact.
6. See Candidus Dougherty, While the Government Fiddled Around, the Big Easy
Drowned: How the Posse Comitatus Act Became the Government's Alibi for the Hurricane
Katrina Disaster, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
938249.
7. See id.
8. See Ashley J. Craw, Casenote & Comment, A Call to Arms: Civil Disorder
Following Hurricane Katrina Warrants Attack on the Posse Comitatus Act, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 829 (2007).
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this outcry by amending the Insurrection Acts.9 In 2006, the President
was briefly given the express authority to deploy federal troops in
response to a natural disaster,1" but that express authority was revoked
shortly thereafter by a 2008 amendment."
These amendments leave the PCA prohibitions on shaky ground,
sparking a new debate surrounding the movement to resurrect it.
Many view the PCA as a "bulwark of liberty" that protects civilian life
from military oppression. 12 These commentators argue in favor of
redrafting the PCA in a clearer and more potent form.
13
This argument is, however, premised on two misconceptions.
First, that the PCA applies to presidential action, and second, that the
PCA can, consistent with the United States Constitution, be amended
to restrain Executive action in times of national crisis. In this article, I
demonstrate how both of these assumptions are flawed.
In Part I, I catalog the historical context in which the PCA was
passed and describe the military events that are most commonly used
to support the case for sharply divided civilian and military authori-
ties. In Part II, I discuss the true purpose and intent of the PCA: to
prohibit civilian marshals from calling forth active duty military to
enforce domestic law. I also explore the contours of the emergency
power doctrine to show that it is not clear that Congress could limit
Executive action as a revamped PCA may attempt to do. Lastly, in Part
III, I examine whether a PCA-like law is even necessary by discussing
its commonly proffered justifications. Ultimately, I conclude that
these justifications are flawed and that the PCA is unnecessary.
I. HISTORICAL BACKDROP
Frequently, legal scholars and commentators rely on history, spe-
cifically on the Revolutionary War and Reconstruction Eras, to justify
9. Michael Greenberger, Did the Founding Fathers Do "A Heckuva Job"?
Constitutional Authorization for the Use of Federal Troops to Prevent the Loss of a Major
American City, 87 B.U. L. REV. 397, 400 (2007) (noting that the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act was passed on Oct. 17, 2006).
10. Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006).
11. Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 325 (2008).
12. Dan Bennett, Comment, The Domestic Role of the Military in America: Why
Modifying or Repealing the Posse Comitatus Act Would Be a Mistake, 10 LEwIS & CLARK
L. REV. 935, 936 (2006).
13. See, e.g., John R. Longley III, Note, Military Purpose Act: An Alternative to the
Posse Comitatus Act-Accomplishing Congress's Intent with Clear Statutory Language, 49
ARIz. L. REV. 717 (2007); Joshua M. Samek, Note, The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina: A Case for Repeal of the Posse Comitatus Act or a Case for Learning the Law?, 61
U. MIAMI L. REV. 441 (2007).
20081
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excluding the military from civilian affairs. In this section, I review the
history surrounding the PCA. I describe the events that took place
during these eras, as well as various congressional and presidential
actions leading up to the passage of the PCA in 1878.
A. The Founding Fathers Fear a Standing Army
The Roman Army, which was not permitted to cross the river
Rubicon into Italy, 14 is a prime example of the dangers of a standing
military. During nearly the entire 1229 years it existed, the Roman
Empire was at war with external enemies, itself or both.' 5 Although
the Senate (and later the Emperor) was technically in control of the
army, generals refused to cede their power, marched on Rome, and
wrested control of the Empire on at least twelve occasions.16 This in-
fighting severely weakened the state's ability to defend against invaders
and has been blamed for the eventual fall of the Roman Empire.' 7
The Founding Fathers did not need to look to Roman history to
distrust a standing military force;' the United States was founded in
the wake of an oppressive British military rule over civilian affairs.' 9
From 1768 to 1770, British troops occupied Boston to enforce regula-
14. It was treason for a general to bring his legion across the river Rubicon into
Italy. See Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., The Northern Command: Crossing the Rubicon, 29
Executive Intelligence Rev. 64, 65 (2002), available at http://www.larouchepub.com/
eiw/public/2002/eirv29/eirv29n20.pdf; Chalmers Johnson, Remembering the
Rubicon, http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig4/johnson-chalmers4.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2008).
15. LaRouche, supra note 14, at 64-65; Johnson, supra note 14.
16. LaRouche, supra note 14.
17. Romano, supra note 2, at 238 (stating that after Caesar's march on Rome,
Emperors split up the army into small parts to avoid similar trouble, but the legions
were then too weak to fight off invaders).
18. The Founding Fathers, however, were aware of the past military infractions.
George Washington asserted that "Mercenary Armies ... have at one time or another
subverted the liberties of almost all the Countries they have been raised to defend." 26
GEORGE WASHINGTON, Sentiments on a Peace Establishment (May 2, 1783), in THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-
1799, at 388, 388 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1931). James
Madison used the Roman Empire and Europe as additional proof of the dangers of a
standing military in The Federalist: "Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome
proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far
as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military
establishments." THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 245-47 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed.,
Bantam Dell 1982) (1961) (warning that the standing army needed to be handled
cautiously, or the "face of America will be but a copy of that of the Continent of
Europe"-liberty crushed by standing armies and taxes).
19. Kealy, supra note 1, at 389-91.
[Vol. 31:1
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tions and to collect taxes set by the King of England.2' This military
presence led to many confrontations between colonists and British
troops in Boston as well as a general angst throughout the rest of the
colonies. 2
1
During the most noted and bloody conflict, the Boston Massacre,
the British military killed five colonists while attempting to break up
an unruly mob.22 John Adams, defense counsel for the troops who
were tried for these deaths in Boston, declared that such angry upris-
ings were the inevitable result of using the military for law enforce-
ment.23 Regardless, British troops remained in Boston until forcibly
ejected during the Revolutionary War.24 In fact, Parliament passed
new laws in 1774 to add more safeguards for soldiers maintaining civil
order.25
In the Declaration of Independence, American colonists spelled
out precisely how they felt about the use of troops in civilian affairs: it
was tyranny.26 The Declaration of Independence pointed directly to
20. Id. at 389.
21. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1957) ("[Tlhe interference of the military
with the civil courts aroused great anxiety and antagonism . . . throughout the
colonies. For example, Samuel Adams in 1768 wrote: '[I]s it not enough for us to have
seen soldiers and mariners forejudged of life, and executed within the body of the
county by martial law? Are citizens to be called upon, threatened, ill-used at the will of
the soldiery, and put under arrest, by pretext of the law military, in breach of the
fundamental rights of subjects, and contrary to the law and franchise of the land? Will
the spirits of people as yet unsubdued by tyranny, unawed by the menaces of arbitrary
power, submit to be governed by military force? No! Let us rouse our attention to the
common law,-which is our birthright, our great security against all kinds of insult and
oppression."').
22. Stephen C. O'Neill, The Summary of the Boston Massacre Trial, http://www.
bostonmassacre.net/trial/trial-summaryl.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2008) (stating that
the Boston Massacre occurred on Mar. 5, 1770).
23. 3 JOHN ADAMS, Argument, in LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 98, 266 (L. Kinvin
Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) ("Soldiers quartered in a populous town, will
always occasion two mobs, where they prevent one. They are wretched conservators of
peace!").
24. See 1 GREGORY FREMONT-BARNES & RICHARD A. RYERSON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR 113 (James Arnold & Roberta Wiener eds., ABC-
CLIO 2006).
25. David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots and Revolution: The Law and History of
Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REv. 1, 26 (1971) (explaining that under
the Administration of Justice Act of 1174 soldiers could remove cases to other colonies
or to England when accused of using excessive force in order to disband civil uprisings
and that, because of logistical problems, these cases were rarely tried).
26. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("The history of the
present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all
having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.").
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the nonconsensual maintenance of a standing army among the civilian
population,27 the military supremacy over the civilian government, 8
the quartering of troops, 29 and the "mock trials" of troops for the mur-
der of civilians 30 as examples of King George III's repeated "usurpa-
tions"'' and "oppressions."32 The Articles of Confederation echoed
this distrust of the standing military by restricting states from keeping
armies or navies in peacetimes while at the same time requiring states
to have a "well-regulated and disciplined militia. '33
At the Constitutional Convention, delegates discussed, at length,
whether a standing army was necessary since state militias could pro-
tect the nation.34 The debate in Philadelphia largely focused on whom
should be in control of calling the militia35 and whether there should
be a standing army in times of peace.36 Because of the prevalent fear
of a standing military and of a "dominant Chief Executive," the end
result was a separation of these powers among the states and federal
government.37
The Convention delegated to Congress the power to raise a stand-
ing army subject to frequent review of military appropriations, 38 as
well as the power to declare war.39 Domestic military needs were
27. See id. at para. 13 ("He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies
without the Consent of our legislatures.").
28. See id. at para. 14 ("He has affected to render the Military independent of and
superior to the Civil power.").
29. See id. at para. 16 ("For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us.").
30. See id. at para. 17 ("For protecting [soldiers], by a mock Trial, from punishment
for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States.").
31. Id. at para. 31.
32. Id. at para. 30.
33. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, § 4 ("No vessel of war shall be kept up
in time of peace by any State... nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State in
time of peace ... but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined
militia.").
34. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 209 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966).
35. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militias, 114 YALE k.J.
149, 157 (2004).
36. See ROBERT COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC
DISORDERS, 1789-1878, at 12 (1988) ("[Tlhe military clauses of the Constitution were
hammered out in a debate in which the opposition to peacetime standing armies and
to federal control over the militia asserted itself strongly.").
37. See Vladeck, supra note 35, at 157-58.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 ("To raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.").
39. Id. at art I, § 8, cl. 11.
[Vol. 31:1
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deferred to the state militias,40 which could be nationalized by Con-
gress in limited situations.41 The Executive ultimately gained control
of the militias and the army, but only through Congress.42
Despite this system of checks and balances, the debate continued
in The Federalist, where Alexander Hamilton eventually concluded that
the nation needed a standing army.43 He argued that militias are
insufficient to cover the common defense because "[t]he steady opera-
tions of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be suc-
cessfully conducted by a force of the same kind."'44 His reasoning was
that "[wiar, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and
perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice. '45 In
his view, the militia lacked training.46 Additionally, drafting mili-
tiamen into service and frequently taking them away from their jobs
and families would have an adverse effect on the economy.
47
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 145.
41. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 15 ("[Congress shall have the power t]o provide
for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections,
and repel Invasions[.]").
42. See id. at art II, § 2 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States[.]").
43. See THE FEDERALIST No. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 40 ("Safety
from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct .... To be
more safe, [nations] at length become willing to run the risk of being less free ....
Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of constant
preparation, will infallibly produce [standing armies]."); THE FEDERALIST No. 19
James Madison & Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 109 (discussing the red-
tape laden German system of government that required consent from multiple parties
to call upon an army when threatened and arguing that before the government sorts it
out, "the enemy are in the field"); THE FEDERALIST No. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra
note 18, at 141-43 (arguing that a permanent corps is needed to protect the nation
from Europe and the Indians and that the nation needs a navy if it wants to be a
commercial nation); THE FEDERALIST No. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at
144 (stating that relying on the individual states to provide a common defense would
be "a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the
Confederacy" because the militia is not competent to manage national defense); THE
FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 154-55 (expressing that the
standing army is something that is evil but needed, and it will be less evil if it is
enacted as a unified nation); THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note
18, at 160 (stating that a bigger force than a militia is sometimes needed).
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 147 (stating
that the nation would likely have lost its bid for independence if it had relied on the
militias alone).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See THE FEDERALIST No. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 142.
2008]
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Further, Hamilton argued that it would be unfair to force states
that were more vulnerable to attacks from Indians and Europeans
because of their location-such as New York-to build up their
defenses while landlocked states would not have been required to bear
the same burden.48 He acknowledged that there was always a risk that
a standing army would infringe on liberty;4 9 however, Hamilton
pointed to state militias as the safeguard5 0 protecting the nation from a
return to tyranny.5 ' Hamilton's contemporaries-George Washington
and James Madison-expressed less confidence in the capacity of the
state militias and, in their own writings, frequently warned of the
power of standing armies by pointing to the fall of the Roman Empire
and the destruction in Europe.52
This consternation and extensive debate exemplified the general
climate of uneasiness regarding a standing military force that existed
at the birth of the Nation. This wariness was, however, somewhat
short-lived.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 144 (arguing
that allowing one state to beef up its defenses would create "mutual jealousy" among
states, which could lead to conflict and in-fighting).
49. See THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 151; cf. THE
FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison), supra note 18, at 246 (sharing Hamilton's
concession and apprehension regarding a standing army, writing "[a] standing force,
therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary provision[;] [o]n
the smallest scale it has its inconveniences [and o]n an extensive scale its
consequences may be fatal").
50. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 164-68
("There is something so far fetched and so extravagant in the idea of danger to liberty
from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery
.... Where in the name of common-sense are our fears to end if we may not trust our
sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens?"). This is an interesting
argument considering the troops in a standing army would also be citizens and
kindred.
51. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 25, 26, 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at
146, 153-54, 162-63 (showing that Hamilton pointed out that it would take a
conspiracy between the Legislative and Executive Branches for such an abuse of
military power to happen, that it would take a substantial military force to deprive the
nation of liberty, and that citizens would notice this build-up and question, it
particularly in times of peace).
52. See, e.g, 26 GEORGE WASHINGTON, Sentiments on a Peace Establishment (May 2,
1783), in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT
SOURCES, 1745-1799, supra note 18, at 388; THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison),
supra note 18, at 245-48.
[Vol. 31:1
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B. The Militia Acts
In 1789, Congress began chipping away at the stark separation
between military and civilian affairs by using its power under the Mili-
tia Clause of the Constitution to pass the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
allowed federal marshals to "command all necessary assistance" to exe-
cute their duties.53 Shortly thereafter, President Washington received
specific authority to use the militia to protect settlers on the Frontier,
on two separate occasions.5 4
After the passage of the Bill of Rights in 1791, which codified the
existence of militias, the civilian right to bear arms, 55 and the prohibi-
56 fation against the quartering of troops during peacetime, public fear of
the military started to dwindle.57 Since the federal marshals and the
Executive had used the limited grants of militia powers as prescribed,
Congress took the bolder step of granting a general militia authority to
the Executive, and, in doing so, carved out a rather extensive presiden-
tial authority that remains in effect today.58
On May 2, 1792, Congress passed the Calling Forth Act, a tempo-
rary statute59 that authorized the Executive to call the state militias,60
as he saw necessary, to repel invasions and, at the request of the state
legislature or the state executive, to suppress insurrections.61 It also
permitted the Executive to call the militia from an outside state to
enforce the laws of the Union.62 This power, which was of a limited
53. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87.
54. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25 § 5, 1 Stat. 95, 96 (expired 1790); Act of Apr.
30, 1790, ch. 10, § 16, 1 Stat. 119, 121 (repealed 1795).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
57. W. Kent Davis, Swords into Plowshares the Dangerous Politicization of the
Military in the Post-Cold War Era, 33 VAL. U. L. REiv. 61, 65 (1998).
58. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2000).
59. Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795). The Calling
Forth Act was originally due to expire in 3 years. Vladeck, supra note 35, at 160.
60. The Calling Forth Act only allowed the calling of the state militia. Calling
Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795). The Neutrality Act of 1794,
however, allowed the President to call the militia and the regular army, to enforce the
Neutrality Proclamation. Neutrality Act of 1794, ch. 50, §§ 7-8, 1 Stat. 381, 384. In
an effort to stay out of the war between England and France, President Washington
issued the Neutrality Proclamation in April 1793, which criminalized those who aided
either side. Sean J. O'Hara, The Posse Comitatus Act Applied to the Prosecution of
Civilians, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 767, 770 (2005). He sent the federalized state militias to
keep privateers from attacking British ships. Id.
61. Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795).
62. Id.
2008]
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duration, 63 applied only if Congress was not in session, if the Execu-
tive had authorization from a federal judge, and if the Executive had
first sent a cease and desist proclamation.
Almost immediately after its passage, President Washington used
this newly legislated power to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion.64
Washington called forth a federalized militia and led it into Penn-
sylvania to enforce a whiskey excise tax that farmers were refusing to
pay.65 This successful use of the militia powers without an abuse of
discretion led Congress to reenact6 6 the grant of authority in the Mili-
tia Act of 1795.67
The 1795 rendition was far more permissive and did away with
many of the restrictions on the Executive's powers. It removed the
need for a court order, the requirement that Congress not be in ses-
sion, and the distinction between in-state and out-of-state militia.68
Also, it arguably changed the cease and desist proclamation require-
ment to permit a contemporaneous notification rather than to strictly
require advance notification.69 President Jefferson used this broader
calling forth power to institute "an instantaneous levee en masse"70 of
"all officers having authority, civil or military, and all other persons"
to thwart a rumored insurgency, lead by former-Vice President Aaron
Burr, to start a war with the Spanish Territory. v'
The 1795 Act only included the state militias. It was not until the
1807 passage of the Insurrection Acts that the Executive gained the
authority to call both regular army forces and the state militias in cases
of insurrection and obstruction of the laws of the Union.72 President
Andrew Jackson used this power in 1832 to send troops to South Caro-
lina, in order to prevent that state's secession from the Union.73 How-
63. Id.
64. RICHARD NELSON CURRENT & ALAN BRINKLEY, AMERICAN HISTORY: A SURVEY 174
(9th ed. 1995).
65. Id.
66. CLAYTON D. LAURIE & RONALD H. COLE, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES
IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS 1877-1945, at 18 (1997); see also Vladeck, supra note 35, at
162.
67. Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424 (repealed 1861).
68. Vladeck, supra note 35, at 162.
69. Id.
70. MERRILL PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 851 (1975).
71. H.W.C. Furman, Restrictions upon the Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse
Comitatus Act, 7 MIL. L. REV. 85, 88-89 (1960).
72. Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 331-335 (2000)). Congress's power to pass this law stemmed from its war powers
and the militia powers granted in the Constitution.
73. Furman, supra note 71, at 89.
[Vol. 31:1
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ever, the troops were held outside the South Carolina border until
passage of federal legislation authorizing his use of force against the
state.74
In 1850, the question of whether the Executive, under the United
States Constitution, actually needed the authorization of Congress to
call forth the militias was debated. Ultimately, it was determined that
the President did not need such authorization, as this power was con-
sidered inherent in the role of the Executive.75
In the years leading up to the Civil War, the federal authorities
and the Executive acquired more permissive abilities to utilize the mili-
tia and the regular army in the enforcement of federal laws. Perhaps
the most contentious antebellum development was the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850,76 which allowed federal marshals to call a posse comita-
tus 77 to recapture escaped slaves and return them to their owners.7 8
From the start, the law was a source of contention, 79 but Attorney Gen-
74. Id.
75. COAKLEY, supra note 36, at 130.
76. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864). This Act
allowed federal commissioners to issue removal certificates for alleged fugitive slaves
based on the ex parte testimony of the slave owners. PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON,
J.M. BALKIN & AKHIL REED AMAR, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 226
(2006). The testimony of the alleged fugitive slave was not considered. Id. It has been
estimated that ninety percent of the 332 alleged fugitive slaves tried under the Act were
returned to slavery. Id.
77. A posse comitatus, Latin for power of the county, is a group of citizens who are
called together to help a sheriff keep the peace or conduct rescue operations. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (8th ed. 2004). The practice of summoning a posse comitatus,
often shortened to posse, dates back to English common law where a county sheriff
could call upon able-bodied people over the age of fifteen to aid him in the suppression
of a riot and in keeping the peace. See United States v. Hart, 545 F. Supp. 470 (D.N.D.
1982), aff'd, 701 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that only a sheriff could organize a
posse); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 171 (2d ed. 1989) ("[Tlhe body of men above the
age of fifteen in a county (exclusive of peers, clergymen, and infirm persons), whom
the sheriff may summon or 'raise' to repress a riot or for other purposes."). English
common law allowed military personnel to be called, whereas the American usage of
the posse generally did not. See Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in
the Coffin for Posse Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 99, 104-05 (2003) (citing the
"Mansfield Doctrine," which said that uniformed soldiers, while acting as citizens,
could participate in a posse and enforce laws); Kealy, supra note 1, at 389 (pointing
out that the difference between English and American treatment emerged from the
American perception of the dangers associated with using a standing army for local
law enforcement and keeping the peace). This posse practice continues today through
statutes that allow police officers to acquire the assistance of bystanders in making an
arrest or in capturing an escaped prisoner. O'Hara, supra note 60, at 771.
78. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).
79. O'Hara, supra note 60, at 771.
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eral Caleb Cushing exacerbated the situation by issuing an advisory
opinion, later known as the Cushing Doctrine, that allowed marshals
to use the military in a posse comitatus summoned for the purpose of
retrieving a slave.80
On the eve of the Civil War, Congress passed the last major revi-
sions to the Militia Acts and greatly expanded presidential powers
relating to the domestic use of the military. The Suppression of Rebel-
lion Act of 1861 left the decision to summon federal troops to the sole
discretion of the Executive and added "rebellion against the authority
of the Government of the United States""' as a permitted triggering
event. These amendments were used to justify the post-War occupa-
tion of the Southern states by federal troops from 1865 to 1877.82
C. Reconstruction Era Abuses
Immediately after the war, Southern state governments were left
intact under the Presidential Reconstruction Plan.83 However, Presi-
dent Lincoln left federal forces in the South in order to protect the
rights of freed slaves.84  The Union troops-including more than
100,000 African-American soldiers 8 5-did more than merely keep the
peace. They showed contempt for slavery, intervened in civilian dis-
80. Matthew Carlton Hammond, The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of
Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 953, 960 (1997). This directive, given in 1854, became
known as the Cushing Doctrine. It was documented* concluding: "[Tihe posse
comitatus comprises every person in the district or county above the age of fifteen
years whatever may be their occupation, whether civilians or not; and including the
military of all denominations, militia, soldiers, marines. All of whom are alike bound
to obey the commands of a sheriff or marshal." Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse
Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight On 124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding
Before Any More Damage is Done, 175 MIL. L. REV. 86, 99 (2003) (quoting 6 Op. Att'y
Gen. 466, 473 (1854)).
81. Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281.
82. O'Hara, supra note 60, at 771.
83. MICHAEL MARTIN & LEONARD GELBER, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 368
(Leo Lieberman ed., Littlefield, Adams Quality Paperback 1978). In his December
1863 proclamation, President Lincoln offered amnesty to those citizens who swore an
oath of loyalty to the Union and agreed to abide by the newly promulgated laws
regarding slavery. Id. Lincoln was operating under the assumption that the Southern
states had not seceded from the Union but instead had merely rebelled. Id. This plan
allowed readmittance to the Union when ten percent of the 1860 voters took such
oaths. Id. Three occupied Southern states, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee, were
readmitted under this plan in 1864. Id.
84. Felicetti & Luce, supra note 80, at 99-100; see also JAMES E. SEFTON, THE UNITED
STATES ARMY AND RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877, at 5-24 (La. State Univ. Press 1967).
85. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
8-10 (1988).
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putes, and were symbols of the newfound black political power.86 The
wounds of the recently fought war remained fresh.
The Southern states struck back by attempting to reestablish
white supremacy through the implementation of the "Black Codes."8 7
These codes reinserted discrimination into the criminal law by creat-
ing special crimes with harsh penalties that applied only to the newly
freed African-Americans. 8 For example, there were criminal laws
which prohibited [freed men] from keeping weapons or from sell-
ing liquor .... [D]iscriminatory penalties were [evidenced in] laws
which made it a capital offense for a [freed man] to rape a white
woman, or to assault a white woman with intent to rape.... Vagrancy
laws made it a misdemeanor for a [freed man] to be without a long-
term contract of employment; conviction was followed by a fine, paya-
ble by a white man who could then set the criminal to work for him
until the benefactor had been completely reimbursed for his
generosity.
8 9
White supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan perpetrated acts
of intimidation and violence against freedmen. 9° Some Southern
states passed anti-Klan legislation, but domestic law enforcement
efforts were largely unsuccessful in combating the Klan's unlawful
activity, creating significant backlash. North Carolina Governor Wil-
liam Woods Holden took drastic steps to stop the Klan by calling forth
the state militia, imposing martial law in some areas of the state, and
suspending Klan members' habeas corpus rights. 91 As a result, he was
impeached. 92
Congress responded to Southern resistance with the passage of a
more radical Reconstruction plan,93 which was codified in 1867, in
order "[t]o provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel
86. Id.
87. Felicetti & Luce, supra note 80, at 102-03.
88. See John Frank & Robert Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal
Protection of the Laws", 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421, 445-46 (1972).
89. Id.
90. Felicetti & Luce, supra note 80, at 106.
91. HORACE W. RAPER, WILLIAM W. HOLDEN 178 (George B. Tindall et al. eds., The
Univ. of N.C. Press 1985).
92. WYN CRAIG WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE Ku KLUX KLAN IN AMERICA 84-86
(1987).
93. President Johnson's Restoration Plan was based on Lincoln's Plan. MARTIN &
GELBER, supra note 83, at 323. He offered amnesty to everyone except for "certain
prominent former Confederate officers, statesmen and owners of large properties." Id.
Military governors were installed in the Carolinas, Texas, Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi and Georgia, and conventions were held. Id. Pro-slavery and secession
ordinances were repealed under these interim governments. Id.
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States."94 During this period, President Grant authorized federal
troops to act as law enforcement to settle civil disturbances, apprehend
Ku Klux Klan members and bootleggers, patrol borders, enforce reve-
nue laws, quell labor disputes, and guard polls. 95 Specifically, the
1871 Ku Klux Klan Act authorized the President to suspend habeas
corpus and exert martial law as necessary.9 6
The use of troops to guard Southern polling stations was the most
controversial aspect of the Southern occupation and allegedly influ-
enced the results of the 1876 presidential election. 97 In this election,
Samuel J. Tilden won the popular vote; Rutherford B. Hayes won the
electoral vote, but his victory was disputed in three Southern states
and Oregon. 98
Congress decided for Hayes, and as part of his selection, Hayes
agreed to remove federal troops from the South.99 On June 18, 1878,
Congress passed the PCA, which prohibited use of the standing mili-
tary "as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws."' 00 The
original PCA included the following text:
lI]t shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the
United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of
executing the laws, except in such cases .. .[as] may be expressly
authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress; and no money
appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the expenses
incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this section.
And any person willfully violating the provisions of this section shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor[.] 101
The domestic use of the military nevertheless continued in more or
less the same capacity as it had before the passage of the PCA:
between 1877 and 1945, the military was involved in domestic affairs
125 times.10 2
94. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
95. Clarence I. Meeks, III, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in
Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 MIL. L. REV. 83, 89-90 (1975).
96. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3-4, 17 Stat. 13, 14-15 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000); 42 U.S.C. 88 1983, 1985, 1988 (2000)).
97. Davis, supra note 57, at 65.
98. Kealy, supra note 1, at 394.
99. Id.
100. Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 152 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1385 (2000)).
101. Army Appropriations Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878).
102. LAURIE & COLE, supra note 66, at 421.
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II. THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND THE EXECUTIVE
Contrary to much of the Hurricane Katrina-related debate, the
PCA was not intended to prohibit the President from using the military
to enforce the laws. Instead, it was passed with a much more limited
purpose: to repeal the Cushing Doctrine. 10 3 In other words, the PCA
was meant to criminalize the practice of civilian marshals calling forth
military forces, in a posse comitatus, to enforce local law.
While the plain language of the PCA does appear to support the
notion that it prohibits the President from executing the law, history
and other laws demonstrate otherwise. Much of the confusion regard-
ing the reach of the PCA stems from the words "authorized by the Con-
stitution or Act of Congress" in the statutory text.10 4
The referenced language presents two major issues. First, the
Constitution does not explicitly define the Executive's military privi-
leges or prohibit the use of the military for law enforcement. 10 5 This
clause leaves room to read in the presidential emergency powers doc-
trine, 106 a somewhat controversial theory that allows the Executive to
call the military unilaterally in times of emergency. 107 If this doctrine
is valid, and I argue that it is, enforcing a stricter PCA against the Presi-
dent would, in theory, be unconstitutional.10 8
The second issue relates to Congress's passage of legislation that
gives the President express domestic law enforcement authority: the
Insurrection Acts.' 0 9 These laws predated the PCA and were not
repealed, or even amended, when the PCA was passed." 0 Thus, any
law enforcement power the PCA purportedly takes away from the Pres-
ident, the Insurrection Acts give back.
In this section, I discuss the real purpose of the PCA, as stated by
the Senate Judiciary Committee shortly after its passage. I also investi-
gate the applicability of the PCA to the emergency powers doctrine and
the presidential law enforcement authority under the Insurrection Act.
103. Felicetti & Luce, supra note 80, at 115-16. The Cushing Doctrine allowed
marshals (low ranking officials) to summon army troops into the posse comitatus. Id.
at 115.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
105. Canestaro, supra note 77, at 116-17.
106. Id. at 117.
107. Id. at118.
108. Attorney General Herbert Brownwell, Jr. argued this to President Eisenhower in
1957. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 331 (1957).
109. Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 331-335 (2000)).
110. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2000); see also Army Appropriations Act, ch. 263,
§ 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994)).
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A. The Purpose of the Posse Comitatus Act
In the years immediately following its passage, there was disagree-
ment over exactly what the PCA meant. Specifically, there was confu-
sion over how-and whether-the PCA affected the Executive's power
to call forth the troops.
Originally, some supporters believed that the PCA reinforced the
American tradition of limiting military involvement in civilian
affairs 1 ' and barred the use of federal troops to enforce domestic
law-except where explicitly enumerated by statute." 2 Others, includ-
ing President Hayes, 113 subscribed to the view that the PCA merely
reaffirmed the existing state of the law: the use of federal troops
required an alternative authorization from the Constitution or Con-
gress, and the President had such authorization inherently in the Con-
stitution and by statute in the Insurrection Acts. 114
Pursuant to the later view, the Executive continued calling forth
the military for domestic purposes after the passage of the PCA. The
first such use occurred only a couple months after Hayes signed the
PCA, when he sent troops to quell a civil disorder in Lincoln County,
New Mexico. 115
During this deployment, federal troops spent more than a year
enforcing local law-a deployment no different from the pre-PCA
deployments of Jefferson and Jackson." 6 Hayes's calling forth of the
military was significant, since the same lawmakers who had passed the
PCA were still in office and did not criticize the President's actions as
unlawful. "7
In 1881, President Arthur acted more conservatively when posed
with a similar emergency in Arizona." 8 In Arthur's view, the PCA did
restrain his domestic military actions, so he requested that Congress
111. See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 146-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (pointing
out that this is not an absolute limitation-Congress can authorize military usage in
special circumstances that are expressly authorized).
112. See United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1139 (10th Cir. 2004).
113. Felicetti & Luce, supra note 80, at 119. President Hayes did not feel as though
the PCA applied to action by the President. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 331 (1957)
(pointing to Hayes's diary of July, 30 1878).
114. Linda J. Demaine & Brian Rosen, Process Dangers of Military Involvement in
Civil Law Enforcement: Rectifying the Posse Comitatus Act, 9 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 167, 212-19 (2005).
115. LAURIE & COLE, supra note 66, at 68.
116. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
117. Felicetti & Luce, supra note 80, at 119.
118. Id. at 120.
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amend the PCA-first, in December 1881, and then again in April
1882.119
In response to the second request, a unanimous Senate Judiciary
Committee expressly confirmed that:
The posse comitatus clause referred to arose out of an implied
authority to the marshals and their subordinates executing the laws to
call upon the Army just as they would upon bystanders who, if the
Army responded, would have command of the Army or so much of it
as they had, just as they would of the bystanders, and would direct
them what to do. 1 20
The Committee went on to note:
In all these cases the President of the United States having the
power of employing any part of the Army from three soldiers to three
thousand to assist in the execution of the laws in the Territory of Ari-
zona, retains the dominion over this Army himself and the soldiers
under command of their own officers to aid the civil authorities,
instead of being under the command of the marshal of the
Territory. 1
21
Subsequent Presidents readily called forth the military to quell
domestic uprisings just as Presidents had done before the passage of
the PCA.122 Apparently, they relied on constitutional or congressional
grants of authority, as excepted from the PCA, to do so. The practical
result was that the PCA appeared unsuccessful.
B. The Emergency Powers Doctrine
The emergency powers doctrine is a theory of Executive authority
whereby the President gains seemingly extra-constitutional powers to
use the military when, during times of national crisis, he or she deems
it necessary for the preservation of the nation.'23 Emergency powers
are not expressly defined in the Constitution, and, for this reason,
there is disagreement in the legal community as to not only the extent
of such powers but also whether these powers even exist. 12' The most
controversial aspect of the emergency powers doctrine is how, if at all,
it applies to domestic law enforcement, and, specifically, whether a
unilateral presidential declaration of martial law is ever lawful.
119. Id. at 119-20.
120. 13 CONG. REc. 3458 (1882).
121. Id.
122. See Felicetti & Luce, supra note 80, at 121-23.
123. Canestaro, supra note 77, at 116-17.
124. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE LJ.
1385 (1989).
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The existence of this emergency power, as a constitutionally-
vested authority, is quite important to the review of presidential action
under the PCA. The text of the current statute expressly obviates con-
stitutional action from its terms,125 but that PCA clause is, at least
arguably, superfluous as applied to the Executive. Under the doctrine
of separation of powers, Congress is unable to tighten the PCA restric-
tions on the Executive's use of the military for law enforcement pur-
poses whenever such law enforcement authority is derived from the
Constitution. Therefore, those lobbying for more restrictions on presi-
dential power need to seek a constitutional amendment, not a new fed-
eral statute, to change any emergency-derived Executive law
enforcement power.
1. Frameworks of Emergency Power
In 1989, Professor Jules Lobel categorized emergency powers into
three frameworks: absolutist, relativist, and liberal. 126 Nearly twenty
years later, these frameworks still appear to be an accurate categoriza-
tion of the views among constitutional law scholars regarding emer-
gency powers.
The absolutist view is that there is no such thing as an emergency
power, as it does not exist in the Constitution. 127 The words of Justice
Davis in Ex parte Milligan aptly describe this view:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and peo-
ple, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its pro-
tection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be sus-
pended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doc-
trine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity
on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitu-
tion, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve
its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great
effort to throw off its just authority. 128
To the absolutist, the Founding Fathers' failure to include an emer-
gency power that extends beyond the power to call the militias, wage
war, or to suspend habeas corpus is proof that such power does not
exist. 1 9 "The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emer-
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
126. Lobel, supra note 124, at 1386-88.
127. Id. at 1386-87; Canestaro, supra note 77, at 119.
128. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
129. Lobel, supra note 124, at 1387.
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gency," yet the emergency powers delegated to the Executive were still
quite limited. 130 Moreover, "a country, preserved at the sacrifice of all
the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of
preservation. "131
Unlike the absolutist, the relativist (the second in our framework)
acknowledges that exigencies exist and that the Founding Fathers
could not have possibly predicted all circumstances for which the Con-
stitution must account. 13 2 Under the relativist view, "the Constitution
is a flexible document that permits the President to take whatever mea-
sures are necessary in crisis situations.' 3 3 This framework is sup-
ported by The Federalist134 as well as by early Supreme Court opinions
such as McCulloch v. Maryland where Chief Justice Marshall famously
stated that the "[Clonstitution [was] intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.' '1 35
The third framework, which Professor Lobel called the liberal
framework, deals with the emergency versus non-emergency dichot-
omy.' 36 This theory is also referred to as constitutional dualism,
which is "the notion that there should be provisions for two legal sys-
tems, one that operates in normal circumstances to protect rights and
liberties, and another that is suited to dealing with emergency circum-
stances.' 1 37 The liberalist believes that the Constitution vests the Exec-
utive with the power to act in an emergency but that it gives no actual
130. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934). See also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) ("[The founding
fathers] knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for
authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We
may also suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle
emergencies. Aside from suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
time of rebellion or invasion, when the public safety may require it, they made no
express provision for exercise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis.");
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121.
131. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 126.
132. Lobel, supra note 124, at 1388.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 133-
38.
135. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
136. Lobel, supra note 124, at 1388.
137. John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of
Emergency Powers, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 210, 234 (2004).
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legal authority to do so.' 38 Thus, the President must act extra-consti-
tutionally and, in theory, face legal liability or even impeachment.
In his 1989 article, Professor Lobel asserts that early Presidents
subscribed to the liberalist view of emergency powers, but that present
day Presidents subscribe to the relativist view.139 For the purposes of
this article, it does not matter what type of framework-relativist or
liberal-applies, as either view supports the existence of emergency
powers. However, in my opinion, the relativist and liberal frameworks
differ only semantically. No matter what, there is a limit to even the
relativist President's power when he or she loses the faith of his or her
constituents and ultimately faces impeachment if his or her emergency
actions are egregious enough to offend the conscience of the nation.
Presidents invoking their emergency powers no longer fall on their
swords, as did early Presidents like Thomas Jefferson by openly admit-
ting an extra-constitutional power grab while seeking absolution from
Congress. However, Congress has acquiesced to the Executive's use of
emergency authority and effectively repudiated the need for post facto
explanation and vindication. 1
40
2. Historical Roots of Emergency Power14 '
The roots of the emergency powers doctrine can be traced to John
Locke's views regarding the English doctrine of prerogative by which
the Executive's prerogative included the "[p]ower to act according to
discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law,
and sometimes even against it."'1 42 According to Locke, it was impossi-
ble to designate laws for all "Accidents and Necessities, that may con-
cern the publick," and such unforeseen necessities justified
dispatching with the normal law-making process that became too cum-
bersome or slow to deal with a sudden crisis.143 In Locke's view, "the
Laws themselves should in some Cases give way to the Executive
138. Lobel, supra note 124, at 1390 ("[L]iberalism seeks to separate emergency rule
from the normal constitutional order, thereby preserving the Constitution in its
pristine form while providing the executive with the power, but not legal authority, to
act in an emergency.").
139. See id. at 1392.
140. For example, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (codified as
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548) (2000), but no president has followed its terms and Congress
has not raised the issue. See BREST ET AL., supra note 76, at 723-24.
141. See Lobel, supra note 124 for an extremely detailed account of the history of
emergency power.
142. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 375 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
143. Id.
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Power, or rather to this Fundamental Law of Nature and Government
* .. [that] all the Members of the Society are to be preserved."' 44 Basi-
cally, prerogative was "the exercise of ... self-preservation."'1
4 5
The American version of executive prerogative-the theory of
emergency powers-paralleled the Lockeian reliance on necessity.
146
As explained by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in his book, The Imperial
Presidency:
[Wlhen the executive perceived what he deemed an emergency, he
could initiate extralegal or even illegal action, but that he would be
sustained and vindicated in that action only if his perception of the
emergency were shared by the legislature and by the people. Though
prerogative enabled the executive to act on his individual finding of
emergency, whether or not his finding was right and this was a true
emergency was to be determined not by the executive but by the
community. 147
Prerogative was not expressly included in the Executive powers con-
ferred by the Constitution as such inclusion would have been
counterintuitive.
As discussed above in Part I, the Founding Fathers were wary of
creating an Executive with the supreme power to command the mili-
tary but, at the same time, acknowledged a need for a military force to
protect the nation. Including an express emergency power would have
vested great power in the Executive; whereas requiring the Executive to
rely on executive prerogative, as defined by Locke, put a greater onus
on the President. In other words, the President would have to act
unlawfully in situations he or she deemed emergent and then "throw
himself on the justice of his country" 148 for vindication after the
unlawful act. Under this theory of emergency power, the President
remained amenable to individual sanction by law without such after-
the-fact approval by the legislature.' 49
In 1806, President Thomas Jefferson invoked this theory of emer-
gency powers when he authorized funds for munitions, exceeding his
authority under appropriations laws, after a British frigate attacked a
144. Id.
145. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 8 (Houghton Mifflin
1973).
146. Id. at 23.
147. Id. at 8-9.
148. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 484 (John P. Foley ed., Russell
& Russell 1967) (1900).
149. Lobel, supra note 124, at 1392-93 (describing Lockeian and early-American
views on executive prerogative and emergency power).
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United States ship.150 At the time, Congress was in recess. 15 1 Thereaf-
ter, Jefferson admitted his unlawful action in a full disclosure to
Congress. 152
Several years later, Jefferson expounded on emergency powers:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high
duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity,
of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of
higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to
written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property
and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing
the end to the means.
•.. It is incumbent on those only who accept of great charges, to
risk themselves on great occasions, when the safety of the nation, or
some of its very high interests are at stake. An officer is bound to obey
orders; yet he would be a bad one who should do it in cases for which
they were not intended, and which involved the most important conse-
quences. The line of discrimination between cases may be difficult;
but the good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw
himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his
motives. 15
3
Notably, there is a significant issue posed by applying the Jefferso-
nian view of emergency powers to the modern day state of affairs. Jef-
ferson presupposed an "emergency" that presumably involved a
change from the status quo. But, since the turn of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, the United States has been in a near constant state of national
emergency, which begs the question of what is normal and what is an
emergency. 1
54
3. Inherent Emergency Power
The modern day justification for emergency power is that it is
inherent in the powers delegated to the Executive. 155 The rationale is
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1392.
152. Id. at 1393.
153. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE ESSENTIAL JEFFERSON 208-10 (jean M. Yarbrough, ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 2006).
154. In 1974, the Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers noted that there were "at least 470 significant emergency powers
statutes without time limitations delegating to the Executive extensive discretionary
powers." STAFF OF S. SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT'L EMERGENCIES & DELEGATED EMERGENCY
POWERS, 93D CONG., A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES, at v
(Comm. Print 1974) ("Emergency government has become the norm.").
155. Lobel, supra note 124, at 1404.
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that, under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the President is charged
with enforcing the law of the land, and his or her only means to do so
is to use the military. 156 The constitutional sources of this power are
the Executive Power Clause, the Take Care Clause, the Commander in
Chief Clause, and the implied foreign powers. 157 Because this article is
concerned only with domestic emergencies, I focus on the first three
sources of emergency powers. 158
The emergency powers doctrine is supported by a close textual
reading of Article 11, as compared to Article I, as well as the original
intent of the Founding Fathers. Article Ii's grant of Executive power
does not contain the limiting phrase "herein granted" that is present in
Article I's grant of legislative power. This textual difference is signifi-
cant in that it implies that Congress is a body of enumerated powers,
whereas the Executive possesses inherent powers not explicitly listed
in the Constitution. Some have interpreted this textual difference to
stand for the proposition that Executive power includes anything not
expressly prohibited by the Constitution.1
59
Perhaps even more compelling support for broad and discretion-
ary Executive powers is the prevailing definition of "Executive power"
at the time of the ratification of the Constitution. 160 As noted above,
the Founding Fathers were heavily influenced by the theories of John
Locke and additionally relied on Blackstone and Montesquieu when
drafting the Constitution. 16 1 All three viewed the Executive as possess-
ing far broader powers than those expressly contained in Article 11.162
156. Canestaro, supra note 77, at 118.
157. Lobel, supra note 124, at 1404 (indicating three-"the 'executive power' clause,
the Commander in Chief clause, and the executive's implied power over foreign
affairs"-of the four constitutional sources).
158. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) for a
judicial discussion of this implied foreign power.
159. See Lobel, supra note 124, at 1404 n.96 (noting that Presidents Roosevelt and
Truman relied on this principle and that it was also supported by early commentary by
Hamilton).
160. See Michal R. Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62
TEX. L. REv. 67, 77 (1983) (opining that the Founding Fathers probably intentionally
left emergency powers out of the Constitution because they wanted to create a
Constitution that was ready for anything).
161. Charles J. Cooper, Orrin Hatch, Eugene V. Rostow & Michael Tigar, What the
Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 165, 168 (1988).
162. See id. See also Locke, supra note 142, at 374-80; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765); CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU,
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1762).
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The Founding Fathers intended to create an "energetic execu-
tive' ' 3 and expressly charged the President with the responsibility to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed[.]'" 64 In The Federalist
Number 23, Alexander Hamilton poignantly made the case for broad
Executive powers when he wrote:
[It is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of
national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the
means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances
that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason, no
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which
the care of it is committed.' 6 5
Indeed, rejecting the emergency powers doctrine altogether is tanta-
mount to conceding that "there is something in our Constitution that
denies the people the right of self-preservation. "166
Additionally, the Constitution designates the President as the
"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,"' 67
which has been interpreted to require that the Executive respond in
defense when the nation is attacked by an enemy. In the Prize Cases,
the Supreme Court expressly recognized that this duty included a
response to either an "invasion of a foreign nation" or "States organ-
ized in rebellion[.' 168
Some argue that the Executive power to respond to insurrection,
as articulated in the Prize Cases, is based on the militia powers codi-
fied in the Insurrection Acts, rather than on Article II Executive pow-
ers. 169 This argument is inconsistent with the entirety of the Prize
Cases opinion. Justice Grier carefully noted that the President, pursu-
ant to his authority as Commander in Chief, may not wage war against
a foreign enemy without a declaration from Congress but is permitted
to suppress insurrection pursuant to the Militia Acts.' 70 However, a
different authority is implicated when another party initiates the hos-
tilities. In that case, "the President is not only authorized but bound to
resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to
163. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 427.
164. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
165. THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 133-34.
166. 77 CONG. REc. 4391 (1933) (statement of Rep. Lemke).
167. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
168. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863).
169. See Vladeck, supra note 35, at 186-90 (asserting that the courts have
misapplied the Prize Cases in that the presidential authority in the Prize Cases
stemmed from the Militia Acts and not Article 11). See infra Part II.C for further
discussion regarding the Insurrection Acts.
170. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668.
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accept the challenge . "..."171 A war initiated by a rebellious state "is
none the less a war[.] ' 1 7 2
Inherent emergency Executive power has been recognized in a
number of other key Supreme Court opinions. Chief Justice Marshall
asserted in Marbury v. Madison: "By the constitution of the United
States, the President is invested with certain important political pow-
ers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his
own conscience.
173
Additionally, in the Grapeshot Case, the Court found Lincoln's
establishment of provisional courts during a time of rebellion was a
constitutional exercise of his power as Commander in Chief, even
though such power was not expressly enumerated in the Constitu-
tion." 4 This "duty" to.provide "for the security of persons and prop-
erty, and for the administration of justice" was entrusted to the
President and lasted until the end of the war.' 7 5 Similarly, in Stewart
v. Kahn, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Lincoln's establish-
ment of a blockade-an action part and parcel to dispersing an insur-
gency.' 7 6 In Stewart, the Court noted:
The measures to be taken in carrying on war and to suppress
insurrection are not defined. The decision of all such questions rests
wholly in the discretion of those to whom the substantial powers
involved are confided by the Constitution .... [T]he power is not
limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the insurgent
forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the
immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have
arisen from its rise and progress.' 77
Again, several years later in Cunningham v. Neagle, the Supreme
Court could not "doubt the power of the president to take measures for
the protection of a judge" when it upheld the constitutionality of an
Executive Order authorizing the use of a marshal to protect Justice
Field.'17  Along the same lines, in In re Debs the Court allowed Presi-
dent Cleveland's use of the military to reestablish order in Chicago
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
174. The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall) 129, 132-33 (1869).
175. Id. at 132.
176. Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506-07 (1870).
177. Id.
178. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 67 (1890).
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during the 1894 Pullman strike.' 7 9 Justice Brewer dramatically
explained:
[Tihere is no such impotency in the national government. The
entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of the
land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security of
all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care. The strong arm of
the national government may be put forth to brush away all obstruc-
tions to the freedom of interstate commerce or the transportation of
the mails. If the emergency arises, the army of the nation, and all its
militia, are at the service of the nation to compel obedience to its
laws. 180
It is worth noting, however, that not all American presidents have
agreed with the existence of inherent emergency powers. For example,
former Chief Justice and President Taft explicitly rejected the theory
that executive authority could be derived from anywhere outside the
four corners of the Constitution.'' Taft believed that:
[Tihe President can exercise no power which cannot be reasona-
bly and fairly traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied
or included within such express grant as necessary and proper to its
exercise. Such specific grant must either be in the Constitution or in
an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. There is no undefined
residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be
in the public interest.' 8 2
4. Martial Law
If an inherent emergency power exists, the President would likely
employ it by declaring martial law. Martial law, itself, is a ubiquitous
and ill-defined legal doctrine. The Supreme Court, legal scholars, and
lawmakers have acknowledged that it exists, in some form, but there is
no consensus on exactly what such an action or declaration would
entail and whether it is lawful.'8 3
In 1876, the Supreme Court defined martial law as "the law of
military necessity in the actual presence of war. It is administered by
the general of the army, and is in fact his will. Of necessity it is arbi-
trary; but it must be obeyed."'1 4 More recently, Congress defined mar-
tial law more broadly, without a reference to a state of war, but as
"depend[ing] for its justification upon public necessity. Necessity
179. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 581-82 (1895).
180. Id. at 582.
181. See PAOLO E. COLLETTA, THE PRESIDENCY OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 12 (1973).
182. Id.
183. See generally Vladeck, supra note 35.
184. United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 526 (1876).
[Vol. 31:1
26
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol31/iss1/1
EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
gives rise to its creation; necessity justifies its exercise; and necessity
limits its duration."''
8 5
Interestingly, some legal scholars believe that the moniker "mar-
tial law" is an oxymoron, since by its very nature it requires the Presi-
dent to act extra-constitutionally, or unlawfully. These scholars argue
that martial law should be more appropriately termed "martial rule"
because that later "term is noncommital as to its legality."'18 6 For
example, David Dudley Field argued, before the Supreme Court in Ex
parte Milligan, that:
People imagine, when they hear the expression martial law, that
there is a system of law known by that name, which can upon occasion
be substituted for the ordinary system; and there is a prevalent notion
that under certain circumstances a military commander may, by issu-
ing a proclamation, displace one system, the civil law, and substitute
another, the martial .... Let us call the thing by its right name; it is
not martial law, but martial rule. 187
Field raised a valid point, as even today-nearly 150 years later-
there is still no body of "martial law" guidelines, and the Supreme
Court has issued very few opinions on the matter. 188 The opinions
that do exist are confusing and somewhat contradictory when consid-
ered side-by-side. In fact, they are better used to determine what is not
a valid exercise of presidential emergency power rather than to fashion
a test for what constitutes a legitimate act under martial law.
The two seminal martial law cases are Ex parte Milligan and
Duncan v. Kahanamoku. While not martial law cases, the following
offer additional insight into the Court's view of martial law: the Japa-
nese Internment Cases (Korematsu v. United States, Hirabayashi v.
United States and Ex parte Endo), the Steel Seizure Case (Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer), and the recent War on Terror cases
(Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld). I consider each case in
turn.18
9
185. 32 C.F.R. § 501.4 (1999).
186. See CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 30 (1943).
187. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 35-36 (1866).
188. Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F. L.
REv. 67, 90 (2000).
189. See generally Jason Collins Weida, Note, A Republic of Emergencies: Martial Law
in American Jurisprudence, 36 CONN. L. REv. 1397 (2004); Davies, supra note 188
(presenting additional views on these cases and summaries of other martial law cases).
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a. Ex parte Milligan
The first Supreme Court case to substantively' 90 examine the con-
cept of martial law was Ex parte Milligan, decided in 1866 shortly after
the end of the Civil War.' 91 Writing for the Court in Milligan, Justice
Davis analyzed President Lincoln's inherent authority to declare mar-
tial law and the question of whether some of the actions taken pursu-
ant to that authority were lawful. At issue was the trial of civilian
attorney Lambdin P. Milligan by military commission, pursuant to
presidential proclamation. 192 In the end, the Court concluded that the
trial was illegal.'
93
On August 8, 1862, then Secretary of War Edwin Stanton issued a
proclamation that essentially suspended habeas corpus in the United
States.' 94 The proclamation provided that:
[A]ll U.S. marshals and superintendents or chiefs of police of any
town, city, or district be, and they are hereby, authorized and directed
to arrest and imprison any person or persons who may be engaged, by
act, speech, or writing, in discouraging volunteer enlistments, or in any
way giving aid and comfort to the enemy, or in any other disloyal prac-
tice against the United States. 195
A month later, President Lincoln issued another proclamation that
confirmed the suspension of habeas corpus and authorized trial by
military commission for "all persons discouraging volunteer enlist-
ments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice." 196
The constitutionality of both of these proclamations was suspect,
at best, since it was unclear to which branch the Constitution dele-
gated the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Neverthe-
less, Congress did back the President's suspension of the Great Writ
by passing the Habeas Act in March of 1863.197 The Habeas Act per-
mitted President Lincoln to suspend habeas corpus "whenever, in his
judgment, the public safety may require it."' 9 8 The Act also required
190. Martial law came before the Court in 1849 in Luther v. Borden, but the Court
dismissed the issue as a political question. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 45-47 (1849).
191. See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2.
192. Id. at 107-08; see also Brooks Simpson, Ex parte Milligan, in THE PUBLIC DEBATE
OVER CONTROVERSIAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 34, 34 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2006).
193. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 130.
194. MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
53 (Oxford Univ. Press, USA 1992) (1991).
195. Id.
196. JEFFREY ALAN SMITH, WAR & PRESS FREEDOM: THE PROBLEM OF PREROGATIVE
POWER 105 (Oxford Univ. Press, USA 1999) (1998).
197. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (repealed 1873).
198. Id. § 1.
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the Secretary of War to give a list of the names of those imprisoned
under the Habeas Act to the federal civilian courts. 99 The civilian
courts were then to convene a grand jury, and if the grand jury
returned a no bill, the prisoner would be released from military
custody.2 ° °
Milligan was imprisoned under the Habeas Act, and the Circuit
Court of the United States for Indiana convened a grand jury, which
did not return an indictment.2 °1 Milligan was not, however, released
from custody.20 2 Instead, he was tried by military commission, found
guilty of treason, and sentenced to be hanged.20 3 Milligan appealed
his conviction to the Circuit Court of Indiana, which certified the case
to the Supreme Court.20
4
Justice Davis noted that "[n]o graver question was ever considered
by this court" than whether a military commission had the legal power
to try and sentence a civilian who was neither a prisoner of war nor a
citizen of a rebellious state.20 5 The Court ultimately decided that the
President was "controlled by law" and his "sphere of duty" was to exe-
cute the law-not to make the law.20 6 While Congress had delegated
some power to the President, he had well exceeded that authority by
failing to comply with the requirements of the Habeas Act.
20 7
The Court addressed the issue of martial law head-on and
squarely rejected the assertion that war or the declaration of martial
law instilled in the President unrestrained, lawful power "to suspend
all civil rights and their remedies, and subject citizens as well as
soldiers to the rule of his will." 20 8 This proposition, Justice Davis
explained, would be directly at odds with a republican form of govern-
ment, and that form of martial law was irreconcilable with the consti-
tutional guarantees of civil liberty.20 9 Military rule of this nature was
precisely what the Founding Fathers sought to prevent.210
Yet, martial law was not, on its face, unlawful. The Court did not
see the issue raised in Milligan as:
199. Id. § 2.
200. Id.
201. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 107-08 (1866).
202. See id. at 107.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 108.
205. Id. at 118-19.
206. Id. at 121.
207. Id. 115-16.
208. Id. at 124.
209. See id. at 124-25.
210. Id.
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[A] question of the power to proclaim martial law, when war exists
in a community and the courts and civil authorities are over-thrown.
Nor is it a question what rule a military commander, at the head of his
army, can impose on states in rebellion to cripple their resources and
quell the insurrection. The jurisdiction claimed [in this case was]
much more extensive .... [Tihere was no hostile foot [on Indiana's
soil]; if once invaded, that invasion was at an end, and with it all pre-
text for martial law. Martial law cannot arise from a threatened inva-
sion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such
as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.2 11
Thus, according to the opinion of the Court in Milligan, martial
law could be imposed if there was actual necessity: a war, insurrection
or rebellion; closure of the civilian courts; and in those places within
the theater of war.21 2 Further, presidential emergency authority was
not lawful when it was exercised against a congressional mandate.2 13
Interestingly, in his dissent, Chief Justice Chase defined what he
called "military jurisdiction" a little differently.2 1 4 He wrote:
There are under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdic-
tion: one to be exercised both in peace and war; another to be exer-
cised in time of foreign war without the boundaries of the United
States, or in time of rebellion and civil war within states or districts
occupied by rebels treated as belligerents; and a third to be exercised in
time of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United States,
or during rebellion within the limits of states maintaining adhesion to
the National Government, when the public danger requires its exercise.
The first of these may be called jurisdiction under MILITARY LAW,
and is found in acts of Congress prescribing rules and articles of war,
or otherwise providing for the government of the national forces; the
second may be distinguished as MILITARY GOVERNMENT, supersed-
ing, as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by
the military commander under the direction of the President, with the
express or implied sanction of Congress; while the third may be
denominated MARTIAL LAW PROPER, and is called into action by
Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot be
invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President,
in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within
districts or localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures
public safety and private rights.2 15
211. Id. at 126-27.
212. Davies, supra note 188, at 100.
213. Id.
214. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 141 (Chase, CJ., concurring).
215. Id. at 141-42.
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The Chief Justice believed that Congress derived constitutional author-
ity from these types of "military jurisdiction" to fashion or authorize
military trials for associated crimes. 16 As discussed in more detail in
the following sections, Chief Justice Chase's dictum proprium regarding
military jurisdiction served as the foundation for the justification of
imposing martial law during World War 11.217
b. Duncan v. Kahanamoku
In the 1945 case Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the Supreme Court once
again considered the legality of trying civilians by military tribunal.2 18
This time the tribunals were used in Hawaii, while the territory was
under a declaration of martial law.219 The Court did not invalidate the
declaration of martial law but did, once again, find the use of military
tribunals unlawful. 2
On December 7, 1941, after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor,
the Hawaiian Governor Joseph Poindexter issued a proclamation that
suspended the writ of habeas corpus and placed Hawaii under martial
law 221 pursuant to the Hawaiian Organic Act. 222 This Act provided
that:
[T]he governor shall be responsible for the faithful execution of
the laws of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii within the
said Territory, and whenever it becomes necessary he may call upon
the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States
in the Territory of Hawaii, or summon the posse comitatus, or call out
the militia of the Territory to prevent or suppress lawless violence, inva-
sion, insurrection, or rebellion in said Territory, and he may, in case of
rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public
safety requires it, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or
place the Territory, or any part thereof, under martial law until com-
munication can be had with the President and his decision thereon
made known.2 23
216. Id. at 142.
217. See Weida, supra note 189, at 1402, 1426.
218. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 307-08 (1946).
219. See id.
220. See id at 324.
221. Id. at 307.
222. Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141, 153 (1900).
223. Id.
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President Franklin Roosevelt approved the Governor's action the next
day.224 This imposition of martial law stayed in effect until it was
revoked by the President nearly three years later. 2 5
On December 8, the Governor established military tribunals in
lieu of civil and criminal civilian courts.22 6 The military tribunals did
not follow the normal rules of evidence or procedure, did not have set
codes or predetermined punishments, and were not subject to judicial
appellate review.22 7 Punishment simply needed to be "commensurate
with the offense committed" and could include fine, imprisonment, or
death.228
Duncan was a civilian shipfitter who, on February 24, 1944,
fought in a brawl with two Marines.229 He was tried by military tribu-
nal for violating a military order, convicted, and then sentenced to six
months imprisonment.230 He challenged the jurisdiction of the mili-
tary tribunals by a petition for writ of habeas corpus.23'
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court had to determine to
what extent the military could be used, pursuant to the Organic Act, to
enforce domestic law.2 32 Namely, the Court needed to ascertain
whether this Act authorized the Governor to close all courts and
replace them with military tribunals.233 This analysis focused on
defining "martial law."234
Justice Black, writing for the Court, noted that the term "martial
law" "carrie[d] no precise meaning" and was not defined in the Consti-
tution or another Act of Congress.235 Also, based on the legislative
history of the Organic Act, the intended scope of martial law was
unclear.236 For these reasons, the Court thought that "the answer may
be found in the birth, development and growth of our governmental
institutions up to the time Congress passed the Organic Act."237
224. See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 308.
225. See Davies, supra note 188, at 101.
226. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 308.
227. Id. at 308-09.
228. Id. at 309.
229. Id. at 310.
230. Id. at 310-11.
231. Id. at 311.
232. Id. at 314-15.
233. Id. at 315.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 319.
237. Id.
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Justice Black then surveyed American History and the often noted
civilian distrust and fear of a standing military.2 38 Based on this his-
tory, he concluded that "[1]egislatures and courts are not merely cher-
ished American institutions; they are indispensable to our government.
Military tribunals have no such standing." 239 The Court acknowl-
edged that martial law was intended to permit the military to act vigor-
ously to maintain order and protect against rebellion or invasion, but
was not meant to permit the total replacement of civilian courts by
military tribunals.2 4 °
Like in Milligan, what is notable about Duncan is that the Court
did not find martial law, itself, an unconstitutional use of Executive
power.24 1 In fact, it codified it as a theory of military jurisdiction that
included vast military authority.2 4 2 The Court concluded that martial
law did not permit an all-out military rule-at least not for more than
two years after the immediate emergency had been dispelled.24 3
c. Japanese Internment Cases
During World War II, martial law was not declared in the conti-
nental United States, only in Hawaii, which at the time was still a terri-
tory. Instead, the Executive and Congress imposed several extreme
restrictions on the civil liberties of Japanese-Americans. In two of the
three Japanese Internment Cases discussed herein, the Supreme Court
upheld these actions based on theories of necessity during an
244emergency.
All three cases stem from violations of orders promulgated by Lt.
General J.L. DeWitt. General DeWitt, acting according to authority
vested in him by President Roosevelt's February 19, 1942 Executive
Order No. 9066, imposed a curfew and egress restrictions on Japanese-
Americans.2 4 5 In this Executive Order, the President explained that
"the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protec-
tion against espionage and against sabotage. '24 6 This Order allowed
military commanders "to prescribe military areas ... from which any
or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of
238. Id. at 319-22.
239. Id. at 322.
240. Id. at 324.
241. Id. at 318-19.
242. Id. at 324.
243. Id.
244. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
245. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83, 86.
246. Id. at 85 (quoting Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed.Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942)).
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any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever
restrictions" imposed by the commanders.2 47 Congress codified this
Executive Order in the Act of March 21, 1942 (the Act), which made it
a misdemeanor to disregard a military order.248
In Hirabayashi v. United States, decided on June 21, 1943, the
Court upheld Hirabayashi's conviction, under the Act, for violating a
curfew order.249 The Court extended great deference to the govern-
ment when examining "whether it is within the constitutional power of
the national government, through the joint action of Congress and the
Executive, to impose this restriction as an emergency war measure. '"250
The Court concluded that it could not "sit in review of the wisdom of'
this joint action because the Constitution placed war-making responsi-
bility on the two political branches.251
Using similar logic, in Korematsu v. United States, decided on
December 18, 1944, the Court upheld a military order excluding Japa-
nese-Americans from designated areas on the West Coast.2 52 Kore-
matsu was convicted for violating the Act because he remained in a so-
called "Military Area" in San Leandro, California.253 Justice Black,
writing for the Court, indicated that the Court appreciated the harsh-
ness of the exclusion order.2 4 He wrote:
[W]e are not unmindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a
large group of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and
war is an aggregation of hardships. All citizens alike, both in and out
of uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or lesser measure. Citizen-
ship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of war
the burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of
citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emer-
gency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institu-
tions. But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are
threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensu-
rate with the threatened danger.
25 5
247. Id. at 86 (quoting Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942)).
248. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942), reprinted in 56 Stat.
173 (1942).
249. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 105.
250. Id. at 92.
251. Id. at 93.
252. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16, 223-24 (1944).
253. Id. at 215-16.
254. Id. at 220.
255. Id. at 219-20 (citation omitted).
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Despite this hardship, the Court upheld the exclusion order and Kore-
matsu's conviction.256
In his dissent, Justice Murphy vehemently disagreed with the
exclusion of persons based on their ancestry and viewed such an order
as "fall[ing] into the ugly abyss of racism. '25 7 Importantly, his opinion
was premised on the "absence of martial law[.] ' '2 18 His distinction
between the present case and permissible levels of deference to mili-
tary discretion was apparently based on whether martial law had been
declared. 259 This distinction implied that Justice Murphy would have
sanctioned ancestry-based exclusion had the West Coast areas been
under martial law.
The Supreme Court did not, as suggested by the rhetoric in the
earlier Hirabayashi opinion, give unbridled deference to the govern-
ment's war-making authority; 260 the Court drew the line at the unjusti-
fied detention of loyal Japanese-Americans. In Ex parte Endo, which
was decided the same day as Korematsu, the Court ordered the release
of Endo, who had been detained in a "relocation center. '261 The Court
found that the Act did not authorize the detention of loyal citizens such
as Endo and that the government could achieve its goal of protecting
against espionage and sabotage by way of curfews and exclusion
orders.262
The Court noted that temporary detainment, for purposes of relo-
cation, was acceptable. 263 It was the long-term detention, without
other cause, that was problematic.
Considered together, these three opinions demonstrate how far
the Court is willing to go in an emergency situation when marshal law
is not declared. It is reasonable to infer that the Court could permit at
least equal-if not more extensive-Executive emergency authority
when an area is, in fact, under martial law.
d. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
The extent of inherent Executive power was considered by the
Court again in 1952 in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.264 At
256. Id. at 223.
257. Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 233.
259. Id. at 234.
260. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
261. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 290, 304 (1944).
262. Id. at 297, 302.
263. Id. at 301.
264. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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issue in Youngstown was whether President Truman had acted constitu-
tionally when he issued an order instructing the Secretary of Com-
merce to take control of and to operate steel mills nationwide.2 65 The
Court found that the President had acted unlawfully by issuing this
directive.266
In 1951, in the midst of the Korean War, a dispute arose between
steel companies and their employees over new collectively negotiated
agreements.267 On December 18, 1951, the United Steelworkers of
America gave notice of their intention to strike when their existing
agreements expired on December 31 of that year.26 After the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service and the Federal Wage Stabiliza-
tion Board were unable to help labor and management reach an agree-
ment, the Union gave notice, on April 4, 1952, that it would commence
a nationwide strike at 12:01 A.M. on April 9.269
Because steel was a primary component of nearly all weapons and
war-related materials, the President viewed this proposed strike as a
threat to the national defenses. 27 ° For this reason, the President issued
Executive Order 10,340, instructing the Secretary of Commerce to take
possession and operate the steel mills. 2 ' The Executive Order
attempted to justify this action, stating: "[B]y virtue of the authority
vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as
President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed
forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered ... 272 The Secretary
of Commerce followed this directive and the steel factories protested
the lawfulness of this presidential action in federal court.
273
While the Supreme Court found that President Truman's taking of
property was unconstitutional, it did so in six concurring opinions
and three dissents-not exactly a unified decision of the Court.274 Jus-
tice Black, writing for the Court, explained that the President's power
to issue such an order had to be derived from either the Constitution
or an Act of Congress.275 Since there was no relevant congressional
action, Justice Black analyzed the Executive powers enumerated in the
265. Id. at 582.
266. Id. at 580.
267. Id. at 582.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 582-83.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 583.
272. Id. at 591.
273. Id. at 583.
274. Id. at 580.
275. Id. at 585.
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Constitution-namely, whether this action was lawful pursuant to the
Take Care or Commander in Chief Clauses.
276
Similar to its holding in Milligan, the Court held that the Com-
mander in Chief powers were relegated to the "theater of war" and that
the President was a law enforcer, not a lawmaker.277 The Court took
real issue with expanding the "theater of war" to include seizing "pri-
vate property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping
production.
2 78
Youngstown was not a martial law case, but, in his concurrence,
Justice Jackson shed some light on inherent executive powers and their
relationship to martial law.279 Justice Jackson believed that "Presiden-
tial powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunc-
tion or conjunction with those of Congress. 28 ° To demonstrate his
point, he broke executive action into three classes.
The first type of action is when the President "acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, [and] his authority is at
its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate. '281 A party that challenges this type of
action bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that the action was
unlawful, since that party would be challenging the federal govern-
ment's power as a whole.282
The second class of presidential action is when the "President acts
in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, [and]
he can only rely upon his own independent powers[.]1' 28 3 Justice Jack-
son opined that there was "a zone of twilight" where executive and
congressional power overlap and where a lack of congressional action
can enable independent actions of the President.284
The third class of presidential action is when the "President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,
his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter. ' 285 Justice Jackson placed the steel factory controversy
of Youngstown into this third category, which left presidential action
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 649-51 (Jackson, J., concurring).
280. Id. at 635.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 636-37.
283. Id. at 637.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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"most vulnerable to attack and in the least favorable of possible consti-
tutional postures. '
Despite believing that Executive power was a malleable concept,
Justice Jackson strongly refuted the assertion that the President
"enjoy[ed] unmentioned powers"287 and rejected the existence of
inherent powers not expressly provided for in the Constitution.28 8 He
asserted that "[the Forefathers] knew what emergencies were" but yet
only permitted the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in times of
crisis.2 8 9
Quite notably, Justice Jackson explicitly excluded "the establish-
ment of martial law" from the "extraordinary authority" he found no
basis for in the Constitution.29 ° In dictum proprium, however, Justice
Jackson recognized that the potential Executive use of martial law
implies that such authority does exist under the Constitution.29' His
tiered classification of presidential authority provided a guide under
which the lawfulness of imposing martial law may be reviewed (or jus-
tified) in the future.
e. War on Terror Cases
The detention and treatment of "enemy combatants" at Guanta-
namo Bay as well as the military commissions employed by the Bush
Administration to try said alleged terrorists have been topics of wide-
spread debate in the legal community since 2001 and are the subject of
numerous law review articles. While full coverage of these military
commission cases is outside the scope of this article, they do warrant
mentioning because the Court has touched upon inherent executive
powers and martial law in some of these opinions.
On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda executed terrorist attacks
against the United States. In response to this attack, Congress passed
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorized
President Bush to "use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" or "harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, orga-
286. Id. at 640.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 649-50.
289. Id. at 650.
290. Id. at 651 n.19.
291. Id. at 652-53.
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nizations or persons. 292 Pursuant to the AUMF, President Bush sent
troops into Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and hunt down al Qaeda
operatives.2 93
During this military operation, individuals participating in the
resistance to the United States military were detained as "enemy com-
batants" and then transported to the United States Naval Base in Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba.294 Yaser Esam Hamdi, a United States citizen, was
one of these individuals.295 When it was discovered that Hamdi was a
United States citizen, he was transferred to a continental United States
military base.296 Hamdi was held without charge or access to counsel
until the Supreme Court heard a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
that Hamdi's father brought on his behalf.
297
In 2004 in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court reviewed the issue of
whether the capture and detention by the military of a United States
citizen as an "enemy combatant" was constitutional. 298 The govern-
ment offered two justifications for such detention. First, "the Execu-
tive possesse[d] plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the
Constitution[,]" and, second, that Congress authorized the deten-
tion.299 TheCourt did not address the Article II argument and instead
decided that Congress had authorized Hamdi's detention in the
AUMF.300
Much of the Court's opinion focused on whether the "all neces-
sary and appropriate force" language of the AUMF included the cap-
ture and detention of citizens engaged in hostilities and the length of
such detentions. 30 ' The Court found that detention, as a means to
"prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and
taking up arms once again[,]" was a legitimate measure and an "impor-
tant incident of war."'30 2 However, the detention could only last as
long as the active hostilities,30 3 and a citizen-detainee must have some
292. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
293. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 511.
298. Id. at 516.
299. Id. at 516-17.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 518.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 520.
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means through which he or she can contest his or her status as "enemy
combatant. 
3 04
The Court specifically referenced its earlier holding in Milligan as
support. In the Court's view, Milligan's detention would have been
legal if he had been detained while engaged in battle in support of
Confederate troops, rather than while at home away from the theater
of war.305
The Court also stressed that, while sensitive to the exigencies of
war, it was not prohibited, under the doctrine of separation of powers,
from reviewing Presidential action in this context.30 6 Specifically,
without a congressional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the
Judiciary still had a role in reviewing the government's detention of
citizens.30 7
In his dissent, Justice Scalia strongly disagreed that the Executive's
asserted "military exigency" justified the detention of a United States
citizen without charges.30 In Scalia's view, an enemy of the United
States should be tried in federal court for treason, and the only consti-
tutional mechanism to relax such constitutional protections is a sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus by Congress. 30 9 Scalia asserted
that "indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive" was con-
trary to the "very core of liberty[.]" 3 1 °
Scalia did, nevertheless, recognize the validity of martial law as "a
step even more drastic than suspension of the writ [of habeas
corpus]."'311 He defined martial law as "limited to 'the theatre of active
military operations, where war really prevails,' and where therefore the
courts are closed. 3 12
Two years later in the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Supreme Court again considered the lawfulness of the President's use
of military commissions to try enemy combatants detained pursuant
to the AUMF.313 In Hamdan, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni
304. Id. at 533-34.
305. Id. at 521-22.
306. Id. at 536-37.
307. Id. at 536.
308. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 554-55.
311. Id. at 573 n.4.
312. Id. (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866)).
313. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-948s (2006)), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229, 2234 (2008).
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national, had been captured by United States forces in November of
2001 and subsequently transferred to the Guantanamo Bay military
installation in June of 2002.314 He was still imprisoned when the case
went before the Court.
31 5
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a military order for
the "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism," which provided that all suspected al Qaeda
members "shall .. .be tried by military commission .. .and may be
punished in accordance with the penalties provided under applicable
law, including imprisonment or death. '316 In 2003, the President des-
ignated Hamdan eligible to be tried by military commission, and, by
way of writ of habeas corpus, Hamdan disputed the legality of these
military commissions before the Supreme Court.3 17 Ultimately, the
Court agreed.318
What is interesting about Hamdan, from a martial law perspective,
is that the Court expressly recognized martial law as valid. 319 Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, explained that military commissions
could be used in three circumstances: (1) where martial law has been
declared and civilian courts are closed; (2) where there is a temporary
military government; and (3) during the conduct of war.320 These
three "states" of emergency were quite similar to the types of military
jurisdiction laid out by Chief Justice Chase in his dissent in Milligan.
Justice Stevens went on to describe how military commissions
used under declaration of martial law or a military government were
more expansive than those used during a time of war. 32 1 Namely, mar-
tial law military commissions may be used to prosecute offenses occur-
ring when martial law or a military government is established, not
necessarily during an active hostility.322 Additionally, they may be
used to try all offenses, not just those violations of the laws of war, and
may also be used to gain jurisdiction over everyone, not just those par-
ticipating in the hostilities or members of the military.323
314. Id. at 557.
315. Id.
316. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
317. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566.
318. Id. at 567.
319. Id. at 595.
320. Id. at 595-96 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 598.
323. Cf. id. at 608.
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5. Supreme Court View of Executive Emergency Powers
The only clear conclusion that can be drawn from the previously
discussed Supreme Court decisions is that a declaration of martial law
vests a valid "emergency" power in the President. However, the full
extent of that power and whether such a declaration requires joint
presidential and congressional action is up in the air. The Court does
seem to posit that "martial law" establishes somewhat extreme and
normally extra-constitutional authority in the President to enforce the
law until order can be reestablished. 324
While the Court as recently as Hamdi has expressly refused to
define Article II Executive emergency powers absent a declaration of
martial law, there are general trends that can be gleaned from the rele-
vant opinions previously discussed. First, there must be a genuine
emergency or exigency, not a mere threat of one. Second, there seems
to be a valid emergency power when there is joint Executive and con-
gressional action, even if the Executive acts primarily (and arguably
unlawfully) and is subsequently backed by Congress. Third, the Exec-
utive's law enforcement authority, pursuant to an emergency power,
must occur in the "theater of war" or hostilities, yet this "theater" is
quite loosely defined. Fourth, the domestic civilian courts must be
closed due to crisis, but the Executive cannot close them. Fifth, absent
a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by Congress, the Judiciary
still maintains appellate review over Executive detentions. Sixth, while
the full extent of permissible action is not defined, the military may
take somewhat drastic measures like detention without process or
finite time limits. Lastly, the domestic law enforcement must be
effected through the imposition of military law-not military rule or
occupation.
Of course, all of these general themes can both be supported and
refuted by at least one of the cases discussed in this section. This
shows that, above all, the analysis of inherent Executive emergency
powers is highly fact sensitive and generally still open to debate. Con-
trary to the assertions of critics,325 inherent Executive power exists in
some form; its extent, not its existence, still must be defined.
C. Insurrection Acts
Even without the recognition of inherent Executive emergency
powers, the President still enjoys broad congressionally-delegated
power to call forth the military for law enforcement purposes in times
324. See supra Part ILB.4.
325. See generally Lobel, supra note 124, at 1386-97.
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of crisis. The Insurrection Acts state that the President can call the
state militia and armed forces: (1) at the request of the legislature or
governor of a state to suppress an insurrection;3 26 (2) to enforce the
laws of the United States or suppress a rebellion where normal judicial
proceedings would be insufficient;327 and (3) to protect civil rights
guaranteed under the Constitution.32 s
Under this cluster of legislation, the limits to the President's
power are mainly procedural. For example, before the President can
call on the state militia or armed forces, he needs to order the insur-
gents to desist peaceably.329
The threshold at which this power may be triggered is also quite
low. For instance, § 333 only requires a mere "hind[rance]" '330 to per-
mit military involvement. The President also does not need the per-
mission of a state or Congress. 33 ' The decision to call troops to quell
civil disorder is exclusively delegated to the President and is not sub-
ject to judicial review.332
While the actions of the Confederate states during the Civil War
are generally what is thought of as an insurrection, as meant by § 331,
courts have adopted a broader view by defining insurrection as "a ris-
ing against civil or political authority,-the open and active opposition
of a number of persons to the execution of law in [a] city or state. 333
Insurrection does not require violence or a probability of success; it
needs, "for the time being to defy the authority of the United
States."'334 Those resisting the power of the civil authorities are known
as "insurgents," and anyone who participates-regardless of his or her
motives3 35 -is considered an insurgent.
3 36
Under § 333, the President can summon the militia when the
"authorities of [a] State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect" the rights,
326. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
327. Id. § 332.
328. Id. § 333.
329. Id. § 334.
330. Id. § 333.
331. See id.
332. Monarch Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55 (D.D.C.
1973).
333. In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. 828, 830 (N.D. 11. 1894). In this case, a
grand jury was called to determine whether offenses committed during a railroad
union strike should be prosecuted. Id. at 829-30. This phrase was used in the jury
instructions on the meaning of insurrection. Id. at 830.
334. Id.
335. This raises an interesting question regarding the people who were looting for
food during the Katrina Disaster.
336. In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. at 830.
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privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution.33 7 The
courts have interpreted this statute to mean that the President can
order the militia to protect fundamental rights such as the right to
interstate trayel.338 Presidents Grant, Eisenhower and Kennedy all
used this power to "remove ... obstructions of justice" that "den[ied]
the equal protections of the law" and to "quell ... domestic violence"
in conjunction with civil rights abuses.339
Unlike the Executive emergency powers, the Insurrection Acts are
only Acts of Congress. Therefore, Congress could, conceivably, repeal
them if it wished to extend the law enforcement prohibitions of the
PCA to restrict Presidential action. But, until these laws are repealed,
or at the least amended, the President may avail himself or herself of
the "Act of Congress" exclusion to the PCA and enforce domestic law
pursuant to the generous confines of the Insurrection Acts.
It appeared doubtful, however, that Congress would cull back the
Insurrection Acts powers. In 2006, the Insurrection Acts were
amended, in response to the Hurricane Katrina Disaster, to expand
presidential authority.340 The John Warner National Defense Authori-
zation Act allowed the President, without the consent of the states, to
deploy federal troops in response to a natural disaster or other domes-
tic crisis. 3 4 ' This amendment appeared to strike a fatal blow to the
PCA, as there did not seem to be any type of emergency law enforce-
ment activity not expressly authorized by an Act of Congress and,
therefore, left to be restricted by the PCA. Surprisingly, Congress
amended the Insurrection Acts in 2008 to retake the power granted in
the 2006 Amendments. 342 Thus, the state of the law regarding the use
of military for domestic law enforcement is exactly what it was when
the Katrina Disaster occurred.
III. Do WE EVEN NEED THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT?
Ignoring for the moment the issue of whether Congress can, in
fact, restrict the Executive's use of the military to enforce domestic law
337. 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2000).
338. Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353, 1401 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (finding
that the President could have sent the military in to protect the rights of black citizens
where a white supremacist group planed on blocking-with force if necessary-the
black citizens from disembarking and entering a bus station).
339. Id. at 1401-02.
340. Greenberger, supra note 9, at 399-400.
341. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006).
342. Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 325 (2008).
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in times of emergency, I would like to consider whether a broad restric-
tion, such as that purportedly included in the PCA, is either needed or
prudent. I conclude no, on both counts.
It is important to note that these conclusions neither constitute
my support for unbridled Executive power nor my agreement with
President Bush's exercise of Executive power. There is a marked differ-
ence between, on one hand, taking issue with a blanket and meaning-
less bar and with the flaws in the arguments in support of such
prohibition and, on the other hand, condoning a President's political
agenda and use of his or her official powers. To be clear, I believe that
there is a limit to Executive power and a threshold where presidential
action in the name of protecting the Constitution is prevented.
Instead, I dispute the need for a law that imposes a broad, ill-
defined restriction on Presidential authority. If our nation has issue
with the actions of one particular President, then there are appropriate
individual remedies-such as impeachment-that do not require more
drastic law-altering action.
Like the Founding Fathers, we cannot possibly anticipate every
emergency that may arise. Ten or twenty years ago, many people
would have found it unbelievable that a small cell of terrorists could
hijack and pilot commercial airplanes into the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon, but it happened in 2001. The Hurricane Katrina Disas-
ter reaffirmed that when unexpected circumstances create a state of
chaos, the result is a lawlessness that domestic police are not necessa-
rily suited to handle.
Moreover, the justifications for this broad prohibition against the
use of military for domestic law enforcement are misplaced. In the
following sections, I take a closer look at the reasons typically prof-
fered and demonstrate their flaws.
A. Justification #1: Founding Fathers' Distrust of a Standing Military
Distrust of a standing military was a theme that pervaded the con-
stitutional debates and The Federalist at the time immediately before
and after the founding of our nation. But these discussions were based
on the colonists' experiences under British rule. It is important to
remember that the Founding Fathers were, essentially, common-day
insurgents who led a secession movement which resulted in the forma-
tion of a new country-the United States.343
343. The primary difference between the actions of the American Colonists and
those of the secessionist states during the Civil War was that the colonists triumphed,
whereas the South did not.
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Despite the fear that another King could use a military force to
exert dictatorial power over the infant nation, the Founding Fathers
still provided for an army in the Constitution.344 There was no PCA or
the like, just the Constitution that divided military powers between the
Executive and Congress.345
As discussed in Part 1, the presidential power to call forth the mili-
tia to enforce the domestic law during times of crisis was expressly
codified in the Militia Acts, which were originally passed immediately
after the ratification of the Constitution.346 These Acts were the har-
binger for the Insurrection Acts, still in effect today, and gave signifi-
cant power to the Executive.347 Since their passage, nearly every
President has invoked these Acts in one way or another, and Congress
has not repealed them but instead, as recently as 2006, has extended
the powers they delegate to the President.348
The Militia Acts and their subsequent invocations demonstrate
that the Founding Fathers recognized that military occupation during
a domestic emergency was, at times, necessary. Such use of the mili-
tary is certainly distinguishable from a permanent installation of mili-
tary rule, like that of the British during colonial times.349
Lastly, even the Founding Fathers took extra-constitutional action
when necessity required it. Presidents, like Thomas Jefferson, invoked
the Lockeian theory of executive prerogative to extend their own Execu-
tive authority.3 50
B. Justification #2: Reconstruction Era Abuses
During the Reconstruction Era, the South was occupied and under
the rule of the North.351 The Southern governments had been forcibly
removed to quell an insurgency, and the Union troops were installed to
enforce a new domestic order.352 While an extended military rule was
certainly not desired or even consistent with the American way of life,
this era of history was a time of war and great national crisis. It
demanded the aid of the military.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 58, 68-72.
348. Greenberger, supra note 9, at 400.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19, 26-32.
350. See JEFFERSON, supra note 148, at 484.
351. SUSAN WELCH ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 178 (W. Publ'g Co. 5th ed. 1994).
352. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
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The Union troops were an occupying force, and, as noted above,
acted like one. This level of military rule is distinguishable from the
imposition of martial law in the face of an emergency. In other words,
the United States military would not be entering a domestic forum to
"take over" and forcibly change the citizens' way of life, as did the
Union troops, but rather would be descending into the forum to
restore order.353
Further, the overall view of the American military among civilians
has changed significantly from the view during the Reconstruction
Era. Civilians today view military personnel with a much higher level
of respect and confidence.354 Many citizens and nationals currently
serve in ancillary forces like the National Guard; formerly served as a
means to attend college, to start a civilian career or to achieve citizen-
ship; or have relatives or close friends who serve with honor and
distinction.
C. Justification #3: Differences Between Military and Police Forces
Commentators often point to the differences in military and local
law enforcement training and objectives to justify excluding the mili-
tary from law enforcement roles.355 Specifically, military personnel
are not trained to consider the private rights of enemy soldiers; they
are trained to react with extreme force in high stress battlefield situa-
tions and in armed conflicts on foreign soil against other soldiers.356
Police, on the other hand, are expected to be peacekeepers first, using
deadly force as a last resort.357 However, in the modern day, this train-
ing-based distinction is a misconception.
In 1991, the Pentagon organized Joint Task Force Six UJTF-6) to
coordinate the military training of domestic law enforcement358 and to
carry out law enforcement enhancement missions.359 JTF-6 began
using Special Forces and United States Army Military Police to train
elite law enforcement units, including Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT), Special Response Teams (SRT), Emergency Response Teams
353. Davies, supra note 188, at 85-88.
354. Id. at 74-75.
355. Karan R. Singh, Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-Operations Trained
Police SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 673, 674 (2001).
356. Id. at 704-09.
357. See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
358. Singh, supra note 355, at 689.
359. JTF-6 has participated in an estimated 5,000 missions since its inception. See
Joint Task Force Six (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/
dod/jtf-6.htm.
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(ERT), Special Emergency Response Teams (SERT), and Emergency
Services Units (ESU). 36°
As of the late 1990s, it was estimated that 43% of the 459 SWAT
units then in existence had been trained by the military.361 It is cur-
rently estimated that 89% of police departments serving a population
of over 50,000 have such units; it is unknown how many received mili-
tary training.362
These specialized police units are typically organized in small
teams of five to ten officers equipped with high-destruction weapons
and who are called into high-risk situations that require specialized
training to diffuse.36 3 JTF-6 provides training in skills such as urban
warfare tactics, booby trap removal, combat shooting techniques, and
nighttime shooting skills.364 SWAT units use these skills to deal with
situations stemming from illegal drugs, gang and organized crime
activity, civil rights violations, and domestic terrorism.365
Several years later, due to the success of JTF-6, this effort was
expanded into several different forces dispersed throughout the United
States.366 In 2002, those task forces were consolidated under the con-
trol of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) by the
Department of Defense in response to domestic terrorism threats. 36
7
According to its mission, USNORTHCOM "plans, organizes and exe-
cutes homeland defense and civil support missions. 368
The military's involvement in training local law enforcement has
been a mixed blessing. On one side, increased "sharing" between mili-
tary and local law enforcement has helped train and equip police
forces with new technology that can make a real difference in fighting
crime. However, it has also lead to excessive use of force as seen dur-
ing the Branch Davidian standoff in Waco, Texas in 1996.369
Another downside to the military training of police forces is that
the tactics taught do not necessarily lend themselves to compliance
360. Singh, supra note 355, at 689.
361. Rowan Scarborough, Dangerous Alliances, BNET, Oct. 25, 1999, http://find
articles.com/p/articles/mi_ml 571/is /ai 57155883.
362. Singh, supra note 355, at 680.
363. Id. at 680-81.
364. Id. at 689.
365. Id. at 690-98.
366. About USNORTHCOM, http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2008).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Kealy, supra note 1, at 385.
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with Fourth Amendment restrictions on police action.370 "Using tow
trucks to remove doors [and] flash bangs," which are standard operat-
ing procedures for SWAT, is a far cry from the "knock and announce"
rule to which civilian police officers are held.37' Unfortunately, gang
and drug-related violence has necessitated these more aggressive police
actions.
Having a police force that uses the same techniques as the mili-
tary is not far from having the standing army executing laws. At the
end of the day, the difference between a militarized police force and a
military force policing is nonexistent.
CONCLUSION
In order to bring the country back together after the Civil War, a
compromise was needed. The Posse Comitatus Act was passed to for-
bid the civilian authority from using the military to enforce the law.372
The PCA was not passed to restrict presidential action. In fact, Presi-
dents continued to use the military to enforce domestic law-the first
of such actions occurring immediately after the passage of the PCA.
While many argue that the PCA should be strengthened to prevent
presidential abuses of power, it is not clear that Congress even has the
power, under the Constitution, to restrict the Executive's action in this
manner. Under the controversial emergency powers doctrine, the
Executive has the inherent authority to command the military, to
enforce domestic law, to uphold the Constitution, and to protect the
nation in times of peril.
It is not clear that a stronger PCA, if constitutionally permissible,
would have any meaningful effect on Presidential action. Throughout
history, Presidents have acted first and sought congressional vindica-
tion later. There is no indication that the future would yield different
results.
There are several posited justifications for separating military and
civilian law enforcement roles. These reasons range from the wishes of
the Founding Fathers to the dangers of military oppression. The valid-
ity of these justifications is, like much else in this debate, unclear.
What is clear, however, is that, in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, the military did what disaster relief organizations like FEMA
and local police could not. Within a very short period of time, the
active duty troops reestablished order and fed, medicated, and evacu-
370. Singh, supra note 355, at 707.
371. Id. at 708.
372. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
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ated the stranded New Orleanians-without civilian casualty. Had the
PCA not been in the law books, the military could have rescued the
New Orleanians even faster.
Neither the PCA nor a more vigorous adaptation will stop a mili-
tary coup d'etat or a President from issuing an emergency order he or
she feels constitutionally justified in making. A law such as the PCA
simply forces military commanders to choose between obeying a direct
order from their Commander in Chief or facing criminal liability for
unlawfully enforcing the domestic law-or worse, to choose between
criminal liability and rescuing people like those who were stranded in
New Orleans.
I would rather live with the risk that some day an Executive may
attempt to impose military rule than be stranded in my attic without
food, water, or medication next hurricane season. I imagine the
Katrina refugees would agree.
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